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INTRODUCTION 
Direct funding to users, or student-choice programs, are usually referred to as 
'voucher schemes' in the literature. The literature, however, has little to say 
about vouchers in the context of post-secondary education. A voucher scheme 
at the elementary or secondary school level operates in an environment of com-
pulsory attendance and makes vouchers available to all school-age children who 
use them to buy education at the school of their choice. 
At the post-secondary level, where attendance is not compulsory, a voucher 
scheme would have to take into account (among other things) how many vouchers 
to make available, how much they should be worth, and who would receive them. 
In this respect vouchers resemble scholarships. They could, of course, be made 
available to all students admitted to an accredited post-secondary institution; 
on the other hand, if the supply of vouchers were limited, they could be rationed 
on the basis of academic achievement, family income, athletic ability, competi-
tive examinations, etc. 
The term 'voucher schemes' has become synonymous with systems that 
emphasize student choice in determining the allocation of resources to and 
within education. The coinage of the term is generally attributed to Milton 
Friedman, who used it in his 1955 essay, 'The Role of Government in Education'.1 
In 1980 Friedman re-examined and reaffirmed the concept in a much-publicized 
book he wrote in collaboration with Rose Friedman, 'Free to Choose'.2 More 
recently still John Holland and Saeed Quazi,3 in a study done for the Secretary 
of State, reviewed the voucher literature and proposed a scheme that incorporates 
a financial aid component with a means test. 
Generally speaking, the reasons put forward for adopting a voucher scheme 
are these: greater social equity, improved institutional efficiency, enhanced 
federal visibility in funding of post-secondary education, and promotion of 
specific fields of study. 
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Greater Social Equity 
If the percentage of students from relatively high-income families who attend 
post-secondary institutions is, as seems to be the case, markedly higher than the 
percentage attending from relatively low-income families, then, since vouchers 
are equally available to all students, the scheme will lead to an increased partici-
pation rate by students from low-income families and, hence, accessibility to 
post-secondary education will be more equitably distributed. 
Improved Efficiency 
If the institutions in a constituency currently being funded by direct government 
grants are considered to be inefficient, the reason for this inefficiency is likely to 
be that the institutions are insulated from the pressures of the marketplace and 
hence are not disciplined by competition. Vouchers in the hands of students 
force institutions to compete with each other in order to maximize enrolments 
and consequently their revenue. This competition promotes efficiency. 
Enhancement of the Visibility of the Funding Source 
In a system where the federal government collects taxes and distributes funds for 
post-secondary education to provincial governments, who then in turn provide 
subventions directly to the institutions within the province, the role of the federal 
government is not clearly visible. Visibility of the funding source is greatly 
increased if the federal government distributes vouchers directly to the students 
who use them to buy post-secondary education from accredited institutions. 
Promotion of Specific Fields of Study 
Should a government decide that it is important to steer students into particular 
fields of study, it could do so by apportioning a limited supply of vouchers so 
that more vouchers are available for designated fields of study, or by attaching 
a higher value to vouchers assigned to particular fields of study and allowing the 
students to retain the differential amounts. 
EXPERIENCE WITH VOUCHER SCHEMES 
Experience with voucher schemes is very limited and the test cases or experiments 
that have been tried have not been at the post-secondary education level. A three-
year experiment at Alan Rock, California, seems to be the only one actually to 
have been carried out, and it was limited to a few public schools. A number of 
other attempts have been planned but never implemented. There are, however, 
several voucher-like schemes which have been tried in Canada and the U.S. 
In Canada the Veteran's Rehabilitation Act of 1945 might be said to be an 
example of a voucher scheme. It is evident, however, that it was designed to 
service an easily-defined and finite population over a relatively short period 
of time. 
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In the U.S.A. some states have operated scholarship programs that are available 
to state residents so long as the residents attend a state-supported institution — 
a constraint that limits the 'student-choice' aspect of the voucher concept. 
A direct federal government-to-student grant in the U.S.A. is the Pell grant, 
or basic educational opportunity grant, that distributes federal funds to a group 
of students identified by a means test. The maximum size of the award is $1,400 
and the idea is to guarantee the availability of a minimum level of support for all 
students who want post-secondary education. (It is perhaps worth noting that 
the Reagan Administration has recently announced that the suggested funding 
level of these grants for 1983 is $1.6 - 1.8 billion dollars, down from $2.27 
billion dollars in 1982.) 
SOME VOUCHER SCHEMES CONSIDERED 
The impact of a federal voucher scheme in Canada would depend upon the 
specific details of its implementation and the various responses to the particular 
scheme by the provincial government, the post-secondary institutions, and the 
students. The following skeletal schemes are put forward to illustrate some alter-
natives pertinent to a university context. 
Example A: A scheme design to 
1. increase federal visibility but 
2. not necessarily influence a student's choice of field of study 
would 
(a) place a fixed-value voucher in student hands and 
(b) reduce transfer payments to the provinces on the understanding 
that 
(c) the universities would raise their fees by the value of the voucher and 
receive a lower level of funding from the provinces. 
Some probable consequences would be: 
(i) students would now have to deal with a federal department in order to 
obtain the voucher. This ensures that the source of the funds is known to 
them, but confronts them with one more administrative hurdle; 
(ii) university financing would become more enrolment sensitive, the degree 
of sensitivity depending upon the funding formula used and the value of 
the vouchers; 
(iii) the increased sensitivity of revenue to enrolment would lead to increased 
competition for students by the universities; 
(iv) the reduction in transfer payments would have to be calculated for each 
province, a process that would lead to more federal-provincial haggling 
unless the transfer payment was entirely eliminated so that no calculation 
formula was required. 
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Example B: A scheme designed to 
1. promote equity as well as to 
2. increase federal government visibility but 
3. not necessarily impact upon a student's choice of field of study 
would 
(a) place a higher-value voucher in the hands of students from lower-income 
families and 
(b) place a lower-value 'universal' voucher in the hands of all other students 
and 
(c) reduce transfer payments to the provinces on the understanding that 
(d) the universities would raise their fees by the value of the 'universal' 
voucher and receive a lower level of funding from the provinces. 
Some probable consequences would be: 
(i) all of the consequences in Example A; 
(ii) a method of means-testing applicants for the higher-value vouchers would 
have to be found; 
(iii) the opportunity to attend university would be extended to that segment 
of the lower-income population who find that the higher-value voucher 
is the decisive factor when considering university attendance. 
Example C: A scheme designed to 
1. increase federal government visibility and 
2. influence a student's choice of field of study would 
(a) place a higher-value voucher in the hands of students admitted to fields 
of study specified by the federal government, and 
(b) place lower-value 'universal' vouchers in the hands of all other students, 
and 
(c) reduce transfer payments to the provinces on the understanding that 
(d) the universities would raise their fees by the value of the 'universal' 
voucher and receive a lower level of funding from the provinces. 
Some probable consequences would be: 
(i) all of the consequences in Example A; 
(ii) student demand for specified fields of study would increases; 
(iii) universities with such programs would experience expanded enrolments, 
presumably with some enrolment contraction in their other programs; 
(iv) decreased enrolments in those universities that did not offer the specified 
programs; 
(v) the capacity of the universities with the specified programs would be 
saturated, thus leading to requests for funds (from whom?) in order to 
expand their capacity; 
(vi) universities without such programs would seek permission and funding 
(from whom?) to implement the specified programs; 
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(vii) all students receiving higher-value vouchers would thereby receive a finan-
cial benefit equal to the difference between the value of the two vouchers. 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Many other schemes can be contemplated but the following concepts must be 
considered when they are designed. 
1. In order to encourage students to choose specified programs it is the students 
themselves, not the universities, who must receive the financial benefit. 
2. A voucher system would require a government (federal) department to distri-
bute the vouchers according to specified regulations. 
3. A voucher scheme that is funded by reducing but not eliminating education 
transfer payments to the provinces would lead to disagreements about the 
'correct' amount of funding reduction. 
4. Student aid in the form of extra grants or loans requires a method of means-
testing and is really a program separate from a voucher scheme. 
5. Part-time students would present a particular challenge to a voucher scheme, 
a challenge not addressed in the literature but one that would have to be met 
before a system could be designed for post-secondary education today. 
6. A scheme that takes all of the federal higher education transfer payments and 
converts them to a voucher scheme would mean that about 50% of the univer-
sities' revenue would be directly dependent upon current enrolments. This 
contrasts sharply with the many existing arrangements that reduce the 
enrolment sensitivity of revenue by averaging the enrolments of a number 
of preceding years. 
THE CASE AGAINST VOUCHERS 
Notwithstanding its laudable objectives, there are several reasons why a voucher 
scheme would, on balance, seem to be an unwise innovation in Canadian post-
secondary education. 
First, although there is a growing body of writing on the subject, voucher 
schemes have been little tried anywhere and not at all in a comprehensive post-
secondary educational system. The political and technical variables would seem 
to make voucher schemes a hazardous experiment at this time. 
Second, substantial direct grants to students would be inconsistent with the 
well-established pattern of funding to post-secondary institutions in Canada, and 
a departure from the growing rationalization of programs by governments and 
their advisory councils in certain provinces and the Maritime region. The gains 
in this latter area would be quickly dissipated if institutions were forced to 
compete for students in order to survive. 
Third, the intensified competition would almost certainly bring about the 
demise of a number of institutions which, by virtue of their current program 
configuration and straitened financial circumstances, could not adapt quickly 
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enough to the new situation. (It is possible, of course, that this might be politi-
cally unacceptable, and a voucher scheme would be adjusted to ensure institu-
tional survival. In which case, one would be justified in wondering why have a 
voucher scheme in the first place.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
To return now to the four principal objectives of a voucher scheme, it would 
seem that there are other ways, more consistent with patterns well-established 
and functional, to achieve them. 
1. Promotion of Equity 
Loans and grants to a group of students identified through a means test of 
applicants addresses the equity issue without placing a voucher in the hands 
of every student. 
2. Improvement in Efficiency by Competition 
A desire for increased competition for students by universities as a means of 
improving institutional efficiency, if this were an objective of either level of 
government, can be achieved by increasing the enrolment sensitivity of revenue 
in existing apportionment formulae without introducing vouchers. 
3. Promotion of Specific Fields of Study 
To do this the student must receive the financial incentive. The incentive could 
be achieved by direct awards to students enrolled in the desired programs 
without placing vouchers in the hands of all students. 
4. Enhanced Visibility of the Funding Source 
There is no doubt that vouchers would achieve this objective, but at a price to 
the institutions and, arguably, to the federal government itself. For the insti-
tutions it would mean an increase in the enrolment sensitivity of operating 
revenue, with the year-to-year uncertainty that would engender. It would also 
mean, as has been noted before, the expenditure of scarce resources in student-
recruitment competition. For the federal government it could mean, depend-
ing upon the scheme chosen, the creation of a new bureaucracy to regulate 
and administer the program. It might also be construed that the federal 
government had been responsible for the rise in tuition fees. 
It has been stated by federal ministers and officials that the federal govern-
ment has three principal objectives with regards to post-secondary education in 
the upcoming negotiations with the provinces on Established Programs Financing: 
1. to ensure that federal government monies designated for post-secondary 
education are spent for that purpose and not diverted into other programs; 
2. to be able to give an accounting to the taxpayers of Canada for the way 
in which these funds are allocated by having a direct say in their allocation; 
3. to put pressure on provincial governments to honour their own financial 
commitments to post-secondary education. 
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It would seem that there are at least three alternatives to the present EPF 
arrangements for the federal government to consider that would permit them to 
achieve their objectives. The first is direct assistance to students. The disadvan-
tages to this alternative have been outlined above and ought not, in our view, to 
be tried at this time. The second is direct assistance to institutions. This, from a 
practical point of view, has more to recommend it. It would appear, however, 
that the weight of Canadian constitutional history — legal and conventional — is 
against it. Without agreement between the provinces and Ottawa as to what 
should be funded by whom, the institutions themselves could be the great losers. 
A third way remains. Federal monies and provincial monies could be provided 
to institutions on recommendation from jointly-established advisory councils on 
post-secondary education. Such councils could be by province or region, as 
seemed desirable. On the basis of designated national and/or provincial priorities, 
the need for core-funding, and an agreed-upon division of funding responsibility 
(province by province), the advisory council could recommend to both levels of 
government what each should contribute to the institutions within a jurisdiction 
for the coming year or years. Such a system would meet the objectives set out 
by the federal government; maintain the concept of partnership between Ottawa 
and the provinces in the support of post-secondary education; give a greater 
measure of security to the institutions; and help to make institutions more aware 
of national as well as regional priorities. It would also seem to be a logical evolu-
tion from the present system. 
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